The Battle of France was the campaign fought between 10 May and 25 June 1940 in which German forces overran the Low Countries and France, destroyed the Allied position on the continent, and forced Britain into a war of immediate national survival. For the Royal Air Force, it was the first sustained test of large-scale modern air warfare against the Luftwaffe in the west. RAF fighter, bomber and army-cooperation units were committed from the opening of the offensive, first in support of the British Expeditionary Force and French armies, and later in the air battle that accompanied the retreat to Dunkirk and the final collapse of organised resistance.
The campaign was not simply a prelude to the Battle of Britain. It exposed weaknesses in Allied planning, communications and air doctrine, inflicted severe losses on vulnerable RAF units, and forced difficult decisions about how far aircraft could be risked in France when the defence of Britain itself was approaching. The RAF’s performance in the campaign was therefore significant both for what it attempted in May and June 1940 and for the lessons drawn from defeat.
Strategic Context And Planning
When Germany opened its western offensive on 10 May 1940, British air commitments in France were already divided between immediate battlefield support and the wider need to preserve fighter strength for the home defence of the United Kingdom. British policy had long been shaped by the expectation that the RAF would support the British Expeditionary Force on the continent while still maintaining a credible deterrent and defensive force in Britain. That tension sharpened as soon as the campaign began.
The rapid German advance through the Ardennes and across the Meuse disrupted Allied assumptions about the likely course of operations. Air support plans proved difficult to sustain in a battle that moved quickly, placed forward airfields at risk, and subjected bomber formations to intense fighter and anti-aircraft opposition. The collapse of the front around Sedan was especially important because it showed how quickly the Luftwaffe could gain operational advantage when Allied command arrangements and communications were under severe pressure.
From the British side, the central strategic problem was clear. Aircraft sent to France could help slow the German advance and support the armies already committed there, but losses could not easily be replaced in the middle of the campaign. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, responsible for Fighter Command, remained deeply conscious that fighter strength would soon be needed over Britain itself. The battle in France became a contest not only over territory and armies, but also over the preservation of air power for the next phase of the war.
RAF Forces, Aircraft and Command Structure
RAF forces in France operated principally through the Air Component supporting the British Expeditionary Force and the separately organised Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), associated with Bomber Command. The Air Component provided fighters, reconnaissance and army-cooperation aircraft, while the AASF supplied much of the bomber effort. Separate command arrangements complicated coordination. Types involved included the Hawker Hurricane, Fairey Battle, Bristol Blenheim and Westland Lysander. These units operated in close connection with the British Expeditionary Force and with French commands, but within a command structure often strained by the pace of events and the differing demands of battlefield support, interdiction and air defence.
The fighter component in France faced a difficult task. The Hurricanes had to protect troops, airfields, and lines of communication while also meeting German fighters in a fast-moving campaign that offered little stability. British bombers were required to attack bridges, columns, communications and advancing formations, sometimes at low level and often in conditions that offered limited protection. Units such as 12 Squadron and 105 Squadron became closely associated with the hazardous effort to strike German forces during the campaign’s opening phase.
Senior commanders had to balance immediate operational need with strategic caution. Dowding’s concern about attrition was well-founded, yet the pressure from France for more fighter support was also real. Keith Park‘s experience in directing fighter operations from Britain was part of the wider command response as the air war increasingly moved towards the Channel ports and the evacuation phase. Pilots who would later become more prominent in the air fighting over Britain, including Douglas Bader, also gained early combat experience during the campaign.
The Air Campaign, May–June 1940
The opening phase of the Battle of France brought immediate and heavy demands on RAF units. German surprise, speed and concentration forced British and French air forces to respond in difficult conditions. RAF bombers were sent against bridges and key crossings in an attempt to slow the German armoured thrust. On 12 May, five Fairey Battles of No. 12 Squadron attacked the Albert Canal bridges in Belgium. Four aircraft were lost and the survivor was badly damaged. Flying Officer Donald Garland and Sergeant Thomas Gray received posthumous Victoria Crosses. Leading Aircraftman Lawrence Reynolds, also in their aircraft, was killed. Such operations demonstrated determination, but they also revealed how exposed lightly defended bombers could be against concentrated opposition.
The campaign soon produced some of the grimmest episodes in early-war RAF history. On 14 May, the AASF sent 71 bombers against German crossings and associated targets around Sedan. Thirty-nine were lost amid heavy fighter and anti-aircraft opposition, and the attacks failed to halt the German breakthrough. The losses over Sedan became emblematic of the cost of sending aircraft into heavily defended targets without adequate tactical advantage. The Fairey Battle, in particular, suffered badly in daylight operations of this kind, while Bristol Blenheim units also faced severe hazards. RAF fighter squadrons fought hard to cover ground forces and contest German air superiority, but they could not reverse the broader collapse of the Allied position on the ground.
As the German advance cut behind the Allied armies and drove them back towards the coast, the RAF’s role altered again. The air battle around the retreat and the evacuation was linked directly to Operation Dynamo. Fighter aircraft flew from bases in southern England as well as from forward locations where possible, attempting to shield the beaches, ports and shipping routes from repeated Luftwaffe attacks. Operation Dynamo ran from 26 May to 4 June. Fighting continued after Dunkirk: the renewed German offensive began on 5 June, Paris fell on 14 June, and the French armistice took effect on 25 June. RAF units continued operating and withdrawing during the final phase of the campaign.
Results, Losses And Immediate Outcome
The immediate outcome of the Battle of France was Allied defeat. France fell, the British Expeditionary Force escaped only through evacuation, and the RAF lost experienced aircrew, aircraft and forward operating positions at a moment of acute danger. The campaign demonstrated that British bomber units committed to low-level or poorly protected daylight attacks could suffer disproportionate losses. It also showed how difficult it was to coordinate air support effectively once command networks, transport routes and airfields were under sustained attack.
Yet the result was not simply a record of failure. RAF fighter squadrons imposed real costs on the Luftwaffe, helped protect the withdrawal to Dunkirk, and preserved part of Britain’s trained air strength for the battles still to come. Decisions to withdraw or limit further commitments were painful, but helped prevent Fighter Command from being exhausted before the Battle of Britain. One historical assessment records that of 452 Hurricanes sent to France, only 66 returned to Britain; many were abandoned when repair and evacuation became impossible. These aircraft losses must be distinguished from aircrew casualties. In that sense, the end of the campaign combined military defeat on the continent with institutional survival in the air.
Historical Significance
The Battle of France was one of the most important formative experiences in RAF wartime history. It exposed the vulnerability of aircraft such as the Fairey Battle in the face of modern fighter opposition and concentrated ground fire, and it reinforced the need for better air-ground coordination, communications, logistics and husbanding of fighter resources. Britain’s radar-based air-defence system had already been developed before the campaign; the defeat reinforced the importance of using that existing system effectively. The campaign also sharpened debate over the proper relationship between air power and the army in a fast-moving mechanised war.
The lessons were immediate. Fighter Command entered the Battle of Britain with a clearer understanding of attrition, readiness and the need to concentrate force at decisive points. The bitter experience of retreat and evacuation also shaped later planning for the return to the continent, visible in much more mature joint preparation for operations such as Operation Jubilee and Operation Overlord. For historians of the RAF, the Battle of France is therefore significant not only as a defeat, but as a harsh education in operational reality.
Conclusion
The Battle of France was a disastrous campaign for the western Allies, and for the RAF, it brought severe losses, disrupted plans and difficult strategic choices. Even so, the air fighting of May and June 1940 helped define how Britain would continue the war. The RAF could not halt the German advance, but its fighters helped contest attacks on the evacuation of substantial British forces. The campaign demonstrated the limits of improvisation, the dangers faced by inadequately protected bombers, and the urgency of preserving and reorganising air strength for the defence of Britain. In RAF terms, the Battle of France stands as the costly transition between the opening campaign in the west and the air battles that followed over Dunkirk, the Channel and Britain itself.
