On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces invaded Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula in Operation Kadesh, opening the military phase of the Suez Crisis. The invasion initiated the sequence agreed during secret Anglo-French-Israeli discussions, providing the circumstances for Britain’s and France’s planned intervention against Egypt. For the RAF forces already assembled in the Mediterranean, the attack brought the transition from deployment to combat closer.
The next stages followed on successive days. Britain and France issued their ultimatum on 30 October, and Anglo-French air attacks began on 31 October. The Israeli operation on 29 October therefore marked the trigger for the RAF’s approaching campaign, with British air operations forming a subsequent stage of the intervention.
The crisis behind the invasion
The confrontation had developed after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. The canal was a major route for trade and Middle Eastern oil, while the company’s British and French interests gave the dispute an immediate political and economic importance in London and Paris.
British military preparations began during the summer. An intervention required the movement of forces, equipment and supplies into the Mediterranean, together with planning for air and ground operations against Egypt. The RAF’s concentration in Cyprus and Malta formed part of that wider preparation.
Secret discussions between British, French and Israeli representatives at Sèvres in October connected these preparations with an Israeli attack. Under the agreed sequence, an invasion of Sinai would be followed by Anglo-French demands presented publicly as a means of separating the combatants and safeguarding the canal. Those demands would provide the immediate justification for military intervention.
From Sinai to the ultimatum
Operation Kadesh put that sequence into effect on 29 October. Israeli forces carried the war into Egyptian territory while Britain and France prepared the next political step. The fighting in Sinai supplied the circumstances envisaged in the secret agreement.
The ultimatum issued on 30 October called for a cessation of hostilities and the separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces from the canal area. It also required acceptance of Anglo-French occupation of key positions along the waterway. For Egypt, these conditions involved admitting foreign forces into its territory during an invasion.
Egypt’s rejection was followed by the opening of the Anglo-French air offensive on 31 October. This progression linked three distinct events: Israel’s invasion, the ultimatum and the start of the bombing campaign. Each served a particular purpose within the intervention timetable.
The RAF force awaiting action
Operation Musketeer assigned air power a central task in the coming intervention. Neutralising Egyptian air power would help establish the conditions for subsequent operations around the canal. The British bomber force included Vickers Valiants deployed to Luqa in Malta, alongside English Electric Canberra forces within the wider Mediterranean concentration.
For the Valiant, Suez would bring combat employment with conventional bombs. An aircraft associated with Britain’s strategic bomber force was being committed to a regional campaign with immediate conventional objectives. Its use connected the RAF’s expanding jet-bomber capability with the practical demands of intervention overseas.
By the end of 29 October, the Israeli attack had activated the political timetable around which Anglo-French action had been arranged. The RAF’s deployed force stood on the threshold of operations: the ultimatum would follow the next day, and combat under Musketeer would begin on 31 October.