On 24 October 1956, representatives of Britain, France and Israel concluded the secret Protocol of Sèvres, agreeing a sequence of military and diplomatic action against Egypt. Patrick Dean signed for Britain alongside Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau. Their agreement supplied the political framework for the approaching Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Crisis and the air campaign in which the RAF would participate.
The protocol followed talks held at Sèvres, near Paris, between 22 and 24 October. It linked an Israeli attack in Sinai to Anglo-French demands presented as measures to protect the Suez Canal and separate the opposing forces. Secrecy was an explicit condition of the arrangement.
From nationalisation to intervention
The crisis had developed after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company on 26 July. The canal carried considerable economic and strategic importance for Britain, connecting maritime routes to its overseas interests and the oil-producing Middle East. British and French leaders regarded nationalisation as a challenge to their influence and sought to reverse its consequences.
Military preparations accompanied the diplomatic confrontation. Operation Musketeer provided the framework for Anglo-French action to seize the Canal Zone. The negotiations at Sèvres connected those preparations to an agreed political sequence involving Israel, whose own confrontation with Egypt gave it a separate interest in military action.
The three governments therefore approached the agreement with overlapping objectives. For Britain and France, Israeli operations would create the circumstances in which their intervention could be publicly presented as the protection of an international waterway.
The agreed timetable
The protocol specified an Israeli attack on Egyptian forces on the evening of 29 October, with the aim of reaching the Canal Zone the following day. Britain and France would then address demands to both governments on 30 October.
Egypt was to halt fighting, withdraw its forces ten miles from the canal and accept the temporary occupation of key canal positions by Anglo-French troops. Israel would also be told to halt operations and withdraw its forces to a line ten miles east of the canal. The arrangement thus required Egypt to accept foreign occupation of strategically important positions on its own territory.
A twelve-hour deadline was built into the demands. If Egypt failed to accept the stipulated conditions, Anglo-French military operations against Egyptian forces were envisaged for the early hours of 31 October. The document set out a planned progression from attack to ultimatum and armed intervention, giving the participants a shared timetable before hostilities began.
The RAF and the approaching campaign
The agreement established the political sequence within which British air power would soon be committed against Egypt. RAF preparations already underway for Operation Musketeer were now connected to the Israeli attack and the Anglo-French ultimatum that would precede intervention.
In the ensuing campaign, Anglo-French air operations overcame the Egyptian Air Force before British and French forces occupied Port Said and other positions at the northern end of the canal. Air power supported a combined operation whose success depended on developments ashore and on the international response.
Secrecy and political consequences
The intervention attracted international condemnation and intense pressure, particularly from the United States. British and French forces subsequently withdrew and were replaced by a United Nations force. The crisis exposed the limits of Britain’s ability to sustain military action against such opposition.
Sèvres also established a lasting contradiction between the public justification for intervention and the prior agreement among the participants. The declared purpose of separating combatants rested on a sequence arranged with one of them in advance. For the RAF’s Suez campaign, that political foundation became inseparable from the assessment of its military achievements and the failure of the wider intervention.