On 21 January 1920, aircraft of the Royal Air Force commenced operations in British Somaliland against the forces of Mohammed bin Abdulla Hassan, often referred to by British sources as the “Mad Mullah.” The campaign marked one of the earliest examples of the RAF being employed as the principal instrument of British military action overseas and has frequently been described as the Service’s first independent “Little War.”
For over two decades, Hassan had led a sustained resistance movement against British authority in Somaliland. His Dervish forces operated from fortified strongholds in the interior, launching raids and maintaining a degree of autonomy that had frustrated repeated expeditions by British and allied ground forces. By 1920, the British Government sought a more economical and decisive solution.
The Air Plan and ‘Z’ Squadron
The campaign of January 1920 represented a departure from earlier large-scale land expeditions. Instead of deploying substantial ground forces alone, the British authorities resolved to employ air power as a primary means of striking Dervish positions. A small RAF contingent, commonly referred to as ‘Z’ Squadron, was dispatched to the theatre for this purpose.
Aircraft were assembled and operated from a base established at Berbera on the coast. The location was selected to provide access to inland objectives while minimising logistical exposure. Contemporary accounts note that efforts were made to conceal the nature and scale of the preparations, reflecting both operational security concerns and the novelty of the undertaking.
The aircraft employed were adapted for bombing and reconnaissance. Their role was to locate and attack fortified Dervish positions, disrupt defensive organisation, and support advancing ground columns when required.
Bombing of the Dervish Forts
On 21 January, RAF aircraft commenced bombing operations against Dervish forts in the interior. Three such fortified positions were attacked during the opening phase. The use of aerial bombardment against fixed strongholds represented a significant tactical innovation in this context. Previous land-based assaults had encountered determined resistance and difficult terrain.
The bombing disrupted defensive arrangements and damaged fortifications that had previously withstood conventional attack. The psychological effect of air attack was also considerable. For many defenders, aircraft represented an unfamiliar and unsettling threat, capable of striking from above without direct engagement.
Following the initial air attacks, British and allied ground forces advanced to exploit the disruption. The combination of aerial bombardment and ground manoeuvre proved effective. Within weeks, Dervish resistance collapsed, and Hassan’s long campaign against British authority effectively came to an end.
Casualties and Operational Effect
Precise casualty figures for the opening day are not consistently recorded in surviving summaries, but it is clear that the bombing contributed materially to the rapid conclusion of the campaign. The RAF contingent suffered no significant losses in the initial phase, though operations were conducted in challenging environmental conditions and over unfamiliar terrain.
The relatively small scale of the force involved, compared with earlier expeditions, attracted attention within military and political circles. The Somaliland operation was presented as evidence that air power could achieve decisive results at lower cost in manpower and resources than traditional campaigns.
Significance in the Development of Air Power
The operations beginning on 21 January 1920 have often been cited in discussions of “air control” and imperial policing during the interwar period. While Somaliland was not the only theatre in which the RAF would be employed in such a role, it was among the earliest examples of air power being used as the leading element of a campaign rather than merely in support of ground forces.
The apparent success of the operation influenced British thinking in the years that followed. In regions such as Iraq, the concept of maintaining order through air power, backed by limited ground forces, gained prominence. The Somaliland campaign holds an important place in the RAF’s institutional development.
In the broader history of military aviation, 21 January 1920 illustrates the expanding scope of air operations beyond the battlefields of the First World War. The campaign demonstrated that aircraft could shape outcomes in colonial conflicts and reinforced the perception that air power offered new strategic possibilities. The RAF’s first “Little War” thus marked a formative moment in the evolution of British air doctrine during the interwar period.