On 20 September 1939, Fairey Battle light bombers of No. 88 Squadron were attacked by Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters over France, and two of the RAF aircraft were shot down. The action is often identified as the first operational engagement between RAF and Luftwaffe aircraft in the Second World War. That alone gives it historical importance, but the encounter also revealed a harder truth at the very beginning of the conflict: lightly defended day bombers were dangerously vulnerable when faced by modern single-seat fighters.
The War's Opening Air Encounters
In September 1939, the war in the west was still in its opening phase. Large-scale air campaigns of the kind later associated with the conflict had not yet fully developed, but operational flying had already begun. Reconnaissance, patrol, and bomber activity placed aircrews into hostile airspace before many of the war's broader patterns were fully understood by those taking part.
For the RAF, the Fairey Battle represented a type that had entered service in the years before the war but would soon prove unsuited to the realities of modern aerial combat. It was a single-engined light bomber with limited defensive protection, and its crews faced serious risks if intercepted by fast, well-armed fighters. In theory, the aircraft could carry out useful tactical bombing tasks. In practice, the margin for survival was narrow once enemy fighters appeared.
88 Squadron Under Attack
The encounter involving 88 Squadron on 20 September brought that vulnerability into immediate focus. When the Battles met Bf 109s, the technological and tactical imbalance was plain. The German fighters had the speed, agility, and offensive advantage needed to attack the bombers decisively. Two RAF aircraft were lost, and with them came an early demonstration of the price that bomber crews might pay in daylight operations without strong protection.
This was not simply an isolated skirmish. It pointed to a larger problem that would shape RAF thinking in the months ahead. Aircraft that had been acceptable in pre-war assumptions could become extremely exposed once confronted by the demands of actual combat. The Battle's weaknesses were not theoretical after this point. They had been demonstrated in operational conditions against the Luftwaffe.
Lessons At The Start Of The War
The importance of the action lies in both chronology and meaning. Chronologically, it stands near the beginning of direct air combat between the RAF and its principal European enemy. Operationally, it offered an early warning about the risks of relying on bombers that lacked the speed, protection, or escort needed to survive against first-rate fighters.
This mattered because the early war period was as much a time of testing as of execution. RAF units were learning in combat what aircraft and methods could endure, and what would quickly become untenable. Encounters such as this one forced those lessons forward with brutal clarity. Losses were not abstract indicators, but evidence gathered at the cost of crews and machines.
Significance Beyond The Date
Remembered only as a first meeting between opposing air forces, the incident can appear merely symbolic. In fact, it pointed straight towards one of the central air-power lessons of the early Second World War. Day bombers, slow and lightly defended, could not expect to survive repeated encounters with modern fighters.
The 20 September clash over France therefore deserves attention not simply because it came early, but because it exposed a structural weakness at once. For 88 Squadron and for the RAF more broadly, it was a warning delivered in combat: the war in the air would punish outdated assumptions from the very beginning.